Introduction
Multimedia can be easily and illegally duplicated and manipulated while the digital technology is highly devel− oped. Multimedia authentication and integrity verification have become a popular research area in recent years. In the past, many signature−based image authentication schemes [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] have been proposed to address the authentication and integrity issues. These mechanisms attach a signature, which can be either a hash value of image contents or image characteristics, to the protected image. The received image is verified by comparing its signature to the signature attached to it. These schemes can detect whether a protected image has been changed; however, they cannot locate where tampering occurred. Besides, the attached signature requires additional bandwidth to transmit that may not be available. To solve this problem, fragile watermarking for image au− thentication had been proposed [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . The watermarking− −based schemes use digital watermarks as the authentication data and embed them into the original image directly instead of separately storing the authentication data. What is more, the use of digital watermarks is capable of detecting the tampering areas which is known as the tamper localization.
The main goal of fragile watermarking schemes is to have good localization properties under various attacks. If we use the dot−based embedding scheme to embed the watermark, the detection and location of tampering are sus− ceptible to random noise. Therefore, in order to explicitly localize the tampered area, most fragile watermarking tech− niques are designed as block−wise independent to improve tamper localization accuracy. Wong proposed a public key fragile watermarking scheme for image authentication [20] . It generates a signature using the seven MSBs of the pixels in each image block, and embeds it into the LSBs of the cor− responding blocks. However, Holliman and Memon soon presented a vector quantization (VQ) counterfeiting attack that can construct a counterfeit image from a VQ codebook generated from a set of watermarked images [25] . Since each block is authenticated by itself, the tampering image appears authentic to the block−based watermarking scheme. To resist VQ attack, Wong and Memon proposed an improved scheme by adding an image index and a block index to the inputs of the hash function [21] . However, it requires the authenticator to have a priori knowledge about the image index and, therefore, limits its applicability to some extent.
The basic idea of resisting VQ attack is to make the VQ codebook more difficult to create. Recently, several water− marking schemes based on block−wise dependence have been proposed to achieve this goal. Celik et al. [7] proposed a hierarchically structured watermarking scheme based on Wong's scheme [20] , which provides a block−wise authenti− cation with highly overlapping blocks. It can effectively thwart VQ attack but loss the accuracy of localization. In 2005 Lin et al. proposed a hierarchical watermarking method that embeds the intensity feature of each block within the image into another mapped block [24] . The method is effective to resist the VQ counterfeiting attack, and the precision of tamper detection and localization is close to 99.6% and 100% after level−2 and level−3 inspec− tions. However, it is vulnerable to the four−scanning attack and the constant−average attack [26] . Chang et al. proposed the constant−average attack on the block−based watermar− king scheme, in which the watermark of image block was generated by the average intensity of it [26] . It can tamper each block with constant average intensity and create a counterfeit image without knowing any information about the block−mapping sequence. The tampering image can be authenticated since the average intensity of each block is invariable during the tampering process.
Based on the work of Ref. 24, Wang and Chen proposed a majority−voting based watermarking technique for tamper detection and recovery of colour images [27] . The authenti− cation data of each 2×2 block is extended from 2 bit to 16 bits, thus this method reduces the capacity of watermark embedding and decreases the accuracy of tamper localiza− tion of the self−recovery system. To improve quality of the recovered image, Lee and Lin proposed a dual watermark for image tamper detection and recovery [28] . It maintains two copies of watermark and provides second chance for block recovery in case one copy is destroyed. However, increasing the watermark payload alone is not adequate to improve the quality of the recovered image. Malicious attackers always try to modify meaningful information of an image so that to change its meaning. As a result, the authen− tication system needs the ability to restore modified regions to allow the user to know what the original content is.
Some block−based methods suffer from a critical vulner− ability due to the block−wise independence of embedding processes [25] . Hence, we use the block mapping strategy to achieve the block−wise dependence and make our self−recovery watermarking scheme not vulnerable to the collage attack, VQ attack, and constant−average attack.
In this paper, we present an efficient block−based fragile watermarking scheme for image tamper detection and recovery. As mentioned above, the key point of resisting collage attack and VQ attack is to break block−wise inde− pendency. The proposed scheme uses the block−mapping operation to break block−wise independency and takes the block−neighbourhood into account to determine the legiti− macy of image blocks. In addition, we use the intensity−rela− tion check as the authentication to effectively thwart con− stant−average attack. The proposed scheme can identify any attack with high probability; besides, the results also dem− onstrate that the tampered images can be successfully recov− ered with acceptable visual quality.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we present the proposed watermarking scheme. Experimen− tal results are shown in Sect. 3 to test the performance of our proposed scheme. We analyze the performance of the pro− posed scheme in Sect. 4. Finally, the conclusions are stated in Sect. 5.
Proposed scheme
The proposed image authentication scheme for image tam− per detection and recovery is based on the block−based frag− ile watermarking technique. The flowchart of the proposed scheme consists of the watermark generation and embed− ding process is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Figure 2 shows the tam− per detection and recovery process. The details of the pro− posed scheme are described as follows. 
Block mapping
Suppose that H is an 8−bit grayscale host image of size M×N pixels, where M is assumed to be an even number. This image is divided into non−overlapping 2×2 blocks
) . In the proposed scheme, a block−mapping sequence A ® B ® C ® D ® … ® A is used for watermarking embed− ding, where each symbol represents an individual block. The above sequence means that the recovery data of block A will be embedded into block B, and the recovery data of block B will be embedded into block C, etc.
First, a unique and consecutive integer XÎ{0,1,2,…, T-1} is assigned to each block by raster scanning, where T = (M/2)×(N/2). To generate the block−mapping sequence, we perform the following 1-D transformation on each block X to obtain the one−to−one mapping sequence.
where
are the block numbers of the origi− nal block and the mapped one, respectively, k (k and N are co−prime and Î -
) is a secret key, and T is the total number of blocks in the image. Note that k and T must be co−prime; otherwise, a many−to−one mapping may occur. All pairs X and ¢ X are recorded to form the block−mapping sequence.
Watermark generation
In the proposed scheme, an 8−bit watermark consists of the authentication data and the recovery data is embedded into the LSBs of each image block, where the authentication data is used to identify any modification made to the authen− ticated image, and the recovery data is used to restore those blocks which have been tampered with.
Suppose that the index A is mapped to B in the block mapping sequence. First, we generate the 8−bit feature of image block H B , denoted as F B = (f B0 , f B1 , …, f B7 ) consists of the 6−bit recovery data and the 2−bit authentication data. The recovery data embedded in block H B is composed of the col− our features of block H A whose index A is mapped to B in the block mapping sequence. To improve the visual quality of the restored image, we use the average intensity of the block as the colour feature. For each image block H A , we set the two LSBs of each pixel within the block to zero and compute the average intensity of the block, denoted by avg_H A . The 6−bit recovery data is computed by
where mod(·) denotes the modulo operation. The authentication data of length 2 bits is obtained by exploiting both the parity check and intensity−relation check of each image block. The 2−bit authentication data is com− puted by
where p is the total number of 1s in the six MSBs of avg_H B , and h Bi and h Bj are two different pixels in block H B .
As mentioned above, the key point of resisting collage attack and VQ attack is to break block−wise independency. Thus, the block feature F B is needed to be encrypted by the block index A. Since the block feature is of the length 8 bits and the block index is of the length é ù lg T bits, the block index is needed to be converted from é ù lg T to 8 bits. The
We are then able to generate the 8−bit block index with the following exclusive−or (XOR) operation
The block feature is encrypted by the block index to gen− erate the 8−bit embedded watermark W B = (w B0 , w B1 , …, w B7 ) by the XOR operation,
Watermark embedding
The following algorithm describes how the 8−bit watermark of each block is embedded.
Step 1. Divide the image into non−overlapping blocks of 2×2 pixels. Step 2. Generate the block−mapping sequence by Eq. 1.
Step 3. For each block H B , generate the 2−bit authentication data f B6 and f B7 by Eq. 3 and Eq. 4, respectively. Step 4. From the mapping sequence generated in the Step 2, obtain block A whose recovery information will be stored in block B.
Step 5. Compute the 6−bit recovery data by Eq. 2.
Step 6. Obtain the 8−bit watermark W B by Eq. 5.
Step ® . We can get the 6−bit recovery data {1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0} since avg_H 5 = 60, and the 2−bit authentication data f 13(6) = 0 since avg_H 13 = 116 = (1110100) 2 and f 13(7) = 0. Therefore, we obtain the 8−bit fea− ture of the block H 13 , F 13 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0), and encrypt it by the secret key to form the 8−bit watermark.
Tamper detection
The test image is first divided into non−overlapping blocks of 2×2 pixels, as in the watermark embedding process. For each block Y B of 2×2 pixels, perform the following steps:
Step Note that if a block Y B of size 2×2 pixels is counterfeited by using constant−average attack, it is similar to its original form when its average intensity avg_Y B is too small or too large. As a result, we use a threshold TH for resisting the constant−average attack in Step. 6.
A watermarked image can be precisely inspected whe− ther it has been tampered intentionally or incautiously by checking the extracted watermark. Sometimes, we maybe want to obtain different accuracy for detection under diverse situations and applications. In the level−2 detection, a valid block is further marked erroneous if there are five or more erroneous blocks in its 3×3 block−neighbourhood, as shown in Fig. 3. 
Tampered image recovery
After the hierarchical tamper detection stage, all blocks are marked either valid or erroneous. We only need to recover the erroneous blocks and leave those valid blocks as they are. Assume that block Y B is marked erroneous and its aver− age feature is embedded into block Y C . For each erroneous block Y B , the restoration procedure is described as follows:
Step 1. If block Y C is valid, go to next step; otherwise go to
Step 4. 
Experimental results
In this section, a series of simulations and experiments are conducted to test the performance of the proposed scheme on tamper detection and recovery.
Performance on collage attack
Two kinds of collage attacks are performed to test the per− formance of the proposed scheme in this subsection. The first kind of collage attack tampers an image by copying image blocks from one authenticated image and inserting them to arbitrary positions in the watermarked image. The second kind of collage attack forges an image by combining portions of multiple authenticated images while preserving their relative spatial locations.
First kind of collage attack
We use two 8−bit grayscale images of size of 512×512 pixels, Car and Chess, as shown in Figs 
Second kind of collage attack
To simulate the second kind of collage attack, two 8 Comparing the tampering image with the authenticated image, the modification is so natural that one can hardly suspect any change that had been made to the picture. Using the proposed scheme, the evaluation results show that the blocks which have been modified by collage attack can be correctly identified. Since we use the block index to encrypt the authentication watermark to break the block−wise inde− pendency, the proposed scheme can completely resist collage attack. 
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Performance on VQ attack
Holliman and Memon presented a vector quantization attack on block−based watermarking schemes [21] . VQ exploits the high correlation between neighbouring pixels by quantizing blocks to achieve very low bit rates, and to enable simple encoding/decoding. Thus, some representa− tive watermarked images are first selected as the training images for generating a representative codebook. In such an attack, the attacker is able to create a counterfeit image by finding the appropriate codeword from the codebook. Figure 8 (a) shows the original watermarked Lena image. The corresponding VQ counterfeit image created by using VQ codebook is illustrated in Fig. 8(b) . Figure 8 (c) presents the tamper detection result. Note that the VQ counterfeit image is difficult to be recovered, since all the blocks in the image have been tampered with.
In block−wise independent schemes, the watermark of each block comprises only the authentication information of the block itself. Thus, the counterfeit image generated from the VQ codebook can easily pass the authentication test of block−wise independent schemes since they validate the watermark of each individual block. The proposed scheme breaks the block−wise independency by encrypting the authentication information with the block index, and hence we can effectively thwart VQ attack.
Performance on constant-average attack
Chang et al. proposed the constant−average attack on the block−based watermarking scheme, in which the watermark of image block was generated by the average intensity of it [26] . In their proposed attack, for each tampered block, its 6−bit average intensity is first calculated from the water− marked image. Then, it keeps two LSBs of each pixel in the same place without doing any change. As a result, it can tamper each block with constant average intensity and cre− ate a counterfeit image without knowing any information about the block−mapping sequence. Figure 9 (a) shows the watermarked Jet image. The text on the airplane has been removed by the constant−average attack, as shown in Fig. 9(b) . The size of the modification is about 100×20 pixels. Figure 9 (c) reveals the detected tam− pered areas with TH = 20. The recovered image is shown in Fig. 9(d) . Note that the proposed tamper detection process may not exactly catch any valid modification since we only use one bit feature F B7 to resist constant−average attack. Hence, it results in some seemingly random white noises on the black background represented. However, these white regions can be ignored since their sizes are smaller than 8×8−pixels, which is the minimal definition of image tampering [24] .
Performance analysis
In this section, we analyze the performance of our scheme from aspects of the fidelity of watermarked images, the quality of recovered images, as well as the tamper detection rate. 
Lower bound of PSNR
The PSNR of an image is a general measure for evaluating image quality. In this section, we also use PSNR to measure the image quality of a watermarked image generated by our proposed scheme and investigate the lower bound of PSNR for the watermarked image. The PSNR used to measure the image visual quality is defined as
where MSE is the is the mean square error defined by
where Y i denotes a pixel value of the watermarked image, H i denotes a pixel value of the original image, and M×N is the image size. Since only two LSBs of each pixel are used for embed− ding the watermark, all pixels of each block will be added by 3 in the worst case. The MSE (mean squared error) of this case is 3 2 = 9. Hence, the lower bound of PSNR for the watermarked image can be calculated as PSNR =´= 10 255 9 38 59 10 2 log . ( ) dB
From Table 1 , we can see the PSNRs of the watermar− ked images are all better than 44 dB, which is consistent with the mathematical analysis. 
Image recovery analysis
We know that the quality of a recovered image highly depends on the size of tampered regions and how accurately those tampered blocks can be detected. Also, the complexity of the image content affects the quality of the recovered image. Another important factor influencing the quality of the recovered image is the number of tampered blocks whose corresponding mapping blocks are also forged. Table  2 lists the PSNR values of the recovered images relative to the watermarked images. We find that among all the single tampered images, Car has the best PSNR of 68.23 dB since it has the smallest number of tampered blocks compared with other images. Sky image has the worst image quality of 44.28 dB due to the large quantity of tampered blocks. Figure 10 compares the various tampered sizes vs. the PSNR of image recovery delivered by the proposed scheme and other block−based schemes in Refs. 24, 27-29. Note that the proposed scheme and schemes in Refs. 24, 27 and 28] use the average intensity of each block as recovery infor− mation, whereas scheme in Ref. 29 uses the VQ index to recover tampered blocks. Schemes in Refs. 27 and 28 achie− ved performance similar to our proposed scheme; however, scheme in Ref. 27 was designed for colour images since it generated large watermarks, and scheme in Ref. 28 gener− ated dual watermarks to ensure image recovery. We found that the PSNR values of the recovered images obtained by the proposed scheme are higher than those values obtained by other schemes. Since the block size 2×2 used in the pro− posed scheme is smaller than that used in schemes in Refs. 24 and 29, the proposed scheme achieved more accurate tamper localization accuracy than them. Moreover, another reason is that most tampered blocks in the tampered images are misidentified by schemes in Refs. 24 and 29 under the collage attack and constant−average attack. 
Tamper detection analysis
We analyse the detection algorithm from the following aspects.
First kind of collage attack
The first kind of collage attack tampers an image by copying image blocks from one authenticated image and inserting them to arbitrary positions in the watermarked image. Assume that we forge block B by copying block C form the same water− marked image. Thus, the extracted features ¢ f B6 and ¢ f B7 of the tampered block B are equal to features f C6 and f C7 . However, the whole extracted watermark ¢ W B of the tampered block B is not equal to W C since the recovery feature and the block index are different. As a result, the forged block is unable to pass the authentication test.
Second kind of collage attack
The second kind of collage attack forges an image by com− bining portions of multiple authenticated images while pre− serving their relative spatial locations. Assume that we forge block B by copying block B form the other watermarked image. Thus, the extracted features ¢ f B6 and ¢ f B7 of the tam− pered block B are equal to features f B6 and f B7 . Note that although their block indexes are the same, their correspond− ing mapping block indexes are different since different secret keys generate different block mapping sequences. Therefore, the proposed scheme can effectively detect the forged.
VQ attack
Some representative watermarked images are first selected as the training images for generating a representative codebook. In such an attack, the attacker is able to create a counterfeit image by finding the appropriate codeword from the codebook. In this way, the forged block consists of the approximate recovery data and authentication data, and approximate mapping block index. However, the approxi− mate watermark is not identical to the authenticated water− mark. As a result, the proposed scheme can effectively thwart the VQ attack since the block−wise independency is broken by encrypting the watermark with the mapping block index.
Constant−average attack
The proposed attack keeps two LSBs of each pixel in the same place without doing any change and tampers each block with constant average intensity and creates a counter− feit image without knowing any information about the block−mapping sequence. Thus, the recovery data and the block mapping sequence are unchanged. Only the inten− sity−relation check f 7 is able to detect the forged block, since the pixel difference becomes large to keep the intensity average unchanged by using constant−average attack. As a result, the probability of failing the intensity−relation check is at most 1/2. The miss detection rate after level−2 detection is the probability of failing to detect more than four tampered blocks within the 3×3−block−neighbourhood, which is less than ( ) . % 1 2 6 25 4 = .
Conclusions
In this paper, a block−based fragile watermarking scheme is presented for image tamper detection and tampered image recovery. The proposed scheme embeding a watermark con− sists of the authentication data and the recovery data into each image block. In the tamper detection process, instead of independently testing the embedded authentication data of each block, we take the block−neighbourhood into ac− count and utilize a hierarchical structure to determine the legitimacy of image blocks. In addition, we encrypt the watermark with the block index to break the block−wise independency for resisting various attacks. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme can effectively thwart collage attack, VQ attack, and constant−average attack while sustaining superior localization accuracy. As a result, the evaluation results show that the tampered image created by collage attack and constant−average attack can be successfully recovered with acceptable visual quality. [24, [27] [28] [29] .
